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apply to any foreign newspaper or magazine although containing matter
copyrighted in the United States when such matter is printed or reprinted
by authority of the owner of the United States copyright, unless such
newspaper or magazine contains also copyright matter printed or reprinted
without such authorization.
Perkins Bill (H. R. 5841)
PROHIBITION OF IMPORTATION
SEC. 41. The copyright in any work shall be deemed to be infringed by
any person who knowingly imports for sale or hire or otherwise distributes
in the United States copies of any piratical reprint of a work in which
copyright subsists in the United States, and the importation into the
United States of piratical copies of any work copyrighted in the United
States, shall be, and is hereby, prohibited; and such prohibition of im-
portation shall extend also to any authorized foreign reprint of an Ameri-
can author's work or of a work by an alien author domiciled or resident
in the Unted States, whenever an agreement authorizing such reprint shall
from type set within the limits of the United States or its dependencies,
either by hand or by the aid of any kind of typesetting machine, or from
plates made within the limits of the United States or its dependencies
from type set therein; or, if the text be produced by lithographic, mimeo-
graphic, photogravure, or photo-engraving or any kindred process or any
process of manufacture hereafter devised, then by a process wholly per-
formed within the limits of the United States or its dependencies, and
the printing or other reproduction of the text; and the binding of said
book or periodical shall be performed within the limits of the United
States or its dependencies. Said requirements shall extend also to the
illustrations within a book or periodical consisting of printed text and
illustrations produced by the printing press by means of lithographic,
photogravure or photo-engraving or any kindred process or any process
of manufacture hereafter devised, and also to reproductions by the print-
ing press of separate lithographs, photogravures, photo-engravings, or
reproductions by the printing press, by any kindred process or any proc-
ess of manufacture hereafter devised, except, where in any case, the
subjects represented are located in a foreign country or illustrate any
scientific or technical work or reproduce a work of art. Said require-
ments shall not apply to works in raised characters for the use of the
blind or to works by foreign authors.
SEC. 29. That in the case of a book, lithograph, photogravure, photo-
engraving, or reproduction by any kindred process or any process of
manufacture hereafter devised, manufacture of which is required in the
United States or its dependencies under the preceding section, an affidavit
under the official seal of any officer authorized to administer oaths within
the United States or its dependencies, duly made by the person claiming
copyright, or by his duly authorized agent or representative residing in
the United States or its dependencies, or by the printer who printed the
book, lithograph, photogravure, photo-engraving, or reproduction, shall
be Ifiled in the copyright office within thirty days after such publication,
setting forth the manner in which compliance has been had with the rer
quirements of the preceding section. Such affidavit shall state also the
place where, and the establishment or establishments in which, such type
was set or plates were made or lithograph, photogravure, photo-engrav-
ing, or reproduction by any kindred process or any process of manufacture
hereafter devised, or printing and binding, were performed, and the date
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of completion of printing of the work or the date of publication; and no
action shall be maintained for infringement of the right to publish, print,
or vend the said work in any form produced by any of the printing pres
processes mentioned in the preceding section, at any time or times when
compliance with such preceding section is requisite, or because of any act
or thing done or undertaken during said time or times, unless said affi-
davit shall be filed within said time or the court shall find that the failure
to file said affidavit was due to excusable neglect. The provisions of this
section shall not apply to periodicals, issued regularly at least four times
a year or more frequently.
SEC. 30. During the existence of the copyright in any work the author
of which is an American citizen and to which protection is accorded under
this Act, and in any work by a foreign author when such work has been
published and manufactured within the limits of the United States or
its dependencies, under an assignment covering stated rights for the
United States, registered in the copyright office; then, during the period
in which any edition of American manufacture is published and copies
of such American edition sufficient to supply customers are in the posZes-
sion of the publisher, the importation into the United States of any copies
thereof printed or produced by any of the processes mentioned in sections
28 and 29 of this Act, or of plates or mediums of any kind for making
copies thereof (although authorized by the author or proprietor of any
foreign copyright), except used copies, shall be, and is, hereby prohibited
after a registration of a claim to copyright or rights under section QG
of this Act and deposit of two copies of the American edition: Proridrd,
however, That such prohibition shall not apply-
(a) To any work published in the country of origin with the authoriza-
tion of the copyright proprietor, when imported not more than once
copy at a time for use and not for sale or hire for profit, in good faith,
by or for any person, library or branch thereof, school, college, society
or institution incorporated for educational, literary, philosophical, scientific,
or religious purposes, or for the encouragement of the fine arts; provided
the proprietor of the United States copyright of such work has, within ten
days after written demand, declined or neglected to agree to supply the
copy demanded at a price equivalent to the foreign price thereof and trans-
portation charges, plus customs duties when subject thereto, or provided
that at the date of the order of such copy for importation no registration
and deposit of copies of the American edition have been made as aforesaid;
(b) To any work published in the country of origin with the authoriza-
tion of the copyright proprietor when imported by the proprietor of the
United States copyright for the purpose of filling demands for copies
thereof made pursuant to the preceding subdivision (a);
(c) To works which form parts of libraries or collections purchased en
bloc for the use of societies, institutions, or libraries designated in the
foregoing paragraph (a), or form parts of the libraries or personal bag-
gage belonging to persons or families arriving from foreign countries and
are not intended for sale;
(d) To a foreign newspaper or magazine, although containing matter
copyrighted in the United States printed or reprinted by authority of the
copyright proprietor, unless such newspaper or magazine contains also
copyright matter printed or reprinted without such authorization;
(e) To motion pictures and motion-picture photo plays;
(f) To the authorized edition of a book on a foreign language or lan-
guages;
(g) To works in raised characters for the use of the blind;
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(h) To works imported by the authority or for the use of the United
States:
Provided, further, That copies imported as above may not lawfully bo
used in any way to violate the rights of the proprietor of the American
copyright or annul or limit the copyright protection secured by this Act,
and such unlawful use shall be deemed an infringement of copyright.
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HENRY WADE ROGERS
It is with great sorrow that the Journal reports the death of
Judge Henry Wade Rogers on August 16, 1926. Judge Rogers
was the dean of the Yale Law School from 1903 to 1916. His
methods and his personality indelibly stamped themselves upon
[ 112 ]
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the minds of all the students in the School during that period.
Prior to his appointment by President Wilson as Judge of the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals in 1913, the work of
Judge Rogers had been almost wholly that of an educator. He
had served for long periods as professor and dean of the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School and as president of North-
western University. At the Yale Law School he was held in
affectionate esteem not unmixed with awe by all the students.
None can fail to have a most lively remembrance of his vigor
and impressiveness in the classroom. Many, indeed, thought
that he was too exacting in his requirements.
When Judge Rogers was appointed dean, the Yale Law
School and the development of legal education in the countly
had reached such a stage as to call for certain important
changes in law school policy. The reasons for such changes
were given ringing expression in the reports made by him to
the American Bar Association as chairman of its Committee on
Legal Education. Under the existing requirements for admis-
sion, the Yale Law School was growing so rapidly in numbers
that in a very few years it must have rivaled the very largest
of the unwieldy commercial law schools of today. No one at
Yale was desirous of such a development; and, acting in har-
mony with the whole faculty and the corporation, Judge Rogers
very courageously sacrificed the huge expected income from
tuition and adopted the requirement of college work for admis-
sion to the School-first two years and very shortly afterwards
a complete college course. Judge Rogers was never accused of
lack of courage.
The law faculty in 1903 was composed almost wholly of prac-
ticing lawyers and judges. The increasing complexity of our
national life was already calling for greater specialization and
concentration of effort. Law teaching and research had become
an independent profession. During the administration of Dean
Rogers, the character of the faculty was almost wholly changed.
Judge Rogers was not generally believed to be very diplomatic
in his methods; but it can be said of him that in this develop-
ment-one that in many other schools caused such heart-burn-
ing as to burst out into violent conflict-he brought about the
result without any serious amount of resentment.
By the time of Dean Rogers the case method of instruction
had established itself as far superior to methods previously
used. The Dean recognized this fact and he acquiesced and
assisted in the formal recognition of the case system in this
School. This was in spite of the fact that he regretted the
necessity of making the change in his own courses.
In these ways Judge Rogers greatly influenced the history of
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the Yale Law School. Without making a marked impression
himself in the field of legal scholarship, he fostered scholarship
in others and as a teacher and administrator left his impress
upon the lives and characters of all with whom he came in con-
tact. The Law School owes much to the services of Judge
Rogers as dean.
As a member of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Rogers won the esteem of the bar. He was an arduous
worker and his opinions show his fondness for searching and
accumulating the authorities.
THE RENVOI THEORY REJECTED--EXCEPTIONS
The law of every state includes a domestic or internal law
which applies to local situations, and a body of law which is
applicable in situations involving a foreign element. The latter
is commonly referred to as the conflict of laws rule. Where a
foreign state is the place of domicile, or the place where the con-
tract was made, or the situs of the property, the conflict of laws
rule of the forum may require that the "law" of the foreign
state be applied. Does this reference to foreign "law" mean a
reference to the local law of the foreign state, or does it mean a
reference to the conflict of laws rule of that state? If the latter,
then the court of the forum has accepted what is known as the
renvoi doctrine.'
The answer to this problem depends upon the basic theory of
the conflict of laws. According to some authorities each state
possesses exclusive jurisdiction to control the legal consequences
of facts occuring within that state.2 This theory has been in-
appropriately called a theory of vested rights.3 That this is a
misnomer becomes apparent upon a careful analysis of the legal
concept of "right." - No right exists unless a court will recognize
'Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of
"The Law of a Country" (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 509, 511; HiDmmR,
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (1917) Introduction, xxix. When the con-
flict of laws rule of the second country refers back to the law of the forum
it is called remission (Rilckverweisung); but if the reference is to the law
of a third country it is termed transmission (Weiterverweisung).
2 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. 1883) § 20; BEALE, TREATISE ON TI1
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1916) 100, 104-105. But see Cook, The Logical arl
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 457;
Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (D. N. Y. 1923).
"In the very nature of things courts can enforce no obligations which
are created elsewhere; when dealing with such obligations they merely
recognize them as the original of the copies which they themselves en-
force." Learned Hand, J. in The James McGee, 300 Fed. 93, 96 (S. D.'
N. Y. 1924).
3 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 104 et seq.
4 For an analysis of this concept cf. FOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
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and enforce it as such. If, therefore, the theory of vested rights
be accepted, we should expect, when the court of the forum says
that the "law" of the place of contracting, or of the testator's
last domicile, or of the situs of the property must be invoked, it
means only that the court of the forum will enforce the same
right the court of that foreign state would have enforced in the
identical situation before the court of the forum. According to
this theory of vested rights, the court of the forum cannot create
rights in respect to facts occurring in that foreign state; it must
recognize and enforce only the "rights" created by the law of a
foreign state.5 But does the court of the forum actually enforce
rights vested by the foreign law, or does it create rights which
the foreign law would not grant, rights which do not exist in
that foreign state? Does it enforce the conflict of laws rule
applicable in that foreign state, or does it enforce some new
legal relation created by the court of the forum?
Let us note to what extent the courts of the forum have looked
to the conflict of laws rule of the foreign state. The renvoi prob-
lem came first into prominence on the continent as a result of
the Forgo case,6 decided by the French Court of Cassation. In
that case it was accepted. France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal
seem to have adopted renvoi; but it has been rejected in Italy
and Switzerland. It has been recognized also in the German
Code., Authorities disagree, however, as to whether or not Eng-
land 'should be classified as a renvoi state. DiceyO and Westlake 0
have stated that renvoi has become imbedded in the English
law." . On the other hand, this view is questioned by Sir Freder-
CONCEPTIONS (1923) 65; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the
Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 169.
5 See the statement of the problems of the conflict of laws in B&=nA-, Co;N-
FmCT OF LAWS (1916) § 77-78; Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 459; Loren-
zen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 736.
6 1n re Forgo, 8 Clunet, 61 (1881); aff'd 10 Clunet, 64 (18M).
7Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Lat
(1910) 10 COL. L. REV. 190, 194; Schreiber, Doctrine of Rcnvoi in Anglo-
American Law (1917) 31 HARV. L. REV. 523; Lo0nNzuN, CASES ON CoN 'iaCr
OF LAWS (2d ed. 1924) 843, note 11.
3 See articles cited supra note 7. It has been recognized by the German
Code expressly with respect to capacity, marriage, matrimonial property,
divorce, and succession, provided the foreign law refers bach to German
Law. Article 27, INTRODUCTORY ACT, CIV. CODE. It has been applied to
the relations between parent and child. Imperial Court, Dec. 29, 1910, 8
Revue de Droit International Privi et de Droit Penal International 108,
and it has been enxtended even to a case where the foreign law, instead
of referring to the German law referred to the law of another state. Im-
perial Court, Nov. 8, 1917, Jurstische Wochcnschrift (1918) 173.
9Dicta, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1922) 771, 776.
2oWESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 1925) 25, 42.
11 BENTWICH, THE LAw OF THE D mICILE IN ITS RELATION TO SUCCESSION
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ick Pollock.12 In none of the English cases prior to the recent
case of Davidson v. Annesley [1926] 1 Ch. 692,13 was the problem
plainly presented and squarely met.1 4 In this case, Mr. Justice
Russel said :15 "When the law of England requires that the
personal estate of a British subject, who dies domiciled accord-
ing to the requirements of English law in a foreign country, shall
be administered in accordance with the law of that country, why
should this not mean in accord with the law which that country
would apply, not to the propositus, but to its own nationals legally
domiciled there? In other words, when we say that French law
applies to the administration of the personal estate of an English-
man who dies domiciled in France we mean that French muni.
cipal law which France applies in the case of Frenchmen."
Renvoi was, therefore, frankly rejected as it was in the case of
In 'e Tallmadge,6 which was the first American decision in
(1911) c. 8, favors it so far as the law of domicile is concerned. This con-
clusion, however, has been questioned. Abbot, Is the Renvoi a Part of
the Common Law (1908) 24 L. Q. REV. 133, 135; Lorenzen, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 332-344. Schreiber, op. cit. supra note 7, at 537; BATE, NoTgs
ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE RENVOI (1904) 9, 77, 108-120; BATY, POLARIZrD
LAW (1914) 115-120.
12 The Renvoi in New Yo'rk (1920) 36 L. Q. REV. 91, 92.
13 Here an English testatrix had, according to the English law, become
domiciled in France. She left a will disposing of movables in England.
According to French international law, one having a de facto domicile in
France and leaving surviving children, could not dispose of more than
two-thirds of his movables by will. The French conflict of laws rule re-
ferred the validity of the will to the law of that person's nationality.
Held, that the French internal law should be looked to in the first in-
stance.
141n the following English cases the problem of renvoi was involved:
De Bonneval v. De Bonneval, 1 Curt. 856 (Prerog. 1838); Collier v. Rivaz,
2 Curt. 855 (Prerog. 1841); Maltass v. Maltass, 1 Rob. 67 (Prerog. 1844);
Frere v. Frere, 5 Notes of Cases, 593 (Prerog. 1847); Bremer v. Freeman,
10 Moore P. C. 306 (P. C. 1857); Hamilton v. Dallas, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 257
(1875) ; In re Goods of Lacroix, 2 P. D. 94 (1877) ; In re Trufort, 36 Ch. D.
600 (1887); Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra, 13 App. Cas. 431 (1888); In re
Goods of Brown-Sequard, 70 L. T. R. (N. S.) 811 (Prob. 1894); In re
Johnson [1903] 1 Ch. 821; In re Baines, unreported, decided March 19,
1903 by Mr. Justice Farwell; Armitage v. Attorney General [1906] P.
135; In re Bowes, 22 T. L. R. 711 (1906); Guarantee Trust Co. v. Hanna
& Co., [1918] 1 K. B. 43.
The conclusion in Hamilton v. Dallas was opposed to renvoi. The dic-
tum in Re Johnson favors renvoi, but it is believed that in that case the
court was not only mistaken as to the law relative to domicile, but was not
fully aware of the implications involved in renvoi. None of the decisions
were rendered by a higher court. Bremer v. Freeman was a Privy Coun-
cil decision. This case, however, cannot be said to contain a clear holding
on the subject of renvoi. See cases collected and discussed by Lorenzen,
op. cit. supra note 7.
15 At 709.
16109 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp. 336 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
COMMENTS
which the renvoi doctrine was clearly presented and under-
stood.1 7
Theoretically, it would be impossible to decide any case under
the renvoi doctrine, for the court of the forum cannot decide the
case as though it were sitting as a court of the foreign state.29
Thus, in the instant case, the English conflict of laws rule
requires that the law of the domicile-France-be applied. A
French court would have applied its conflict of laws rule-namely
that the law of the nationality-England-governs. But the
English conflict of laws rule would refer the case back to the
conflict of laws rule of France which in turn would refer the
matter again to English law. Cases which have purported to
apply the r'envoi doctrine have generally considered that the
reference back to the law of nationality is to internal and not to
the conflict of laws rule.0
Renvoi has been applied in two situations in this country, and
then only to reach a result dictated by policy. In one a divorce
was secured in a foreign jurisdiction under such circumstances
that it would not otherwise have been a valid divorce according
to the conflict of laws rule of the forum;2" in the other a marriage
took place which would not have been valid- ,' unless the conflict
of laws rule of the place of celebration had been invoked. To
these two instances should be added a third. When the conflict
of laws rule of the situs of real property will recognize the valid-
17 Schreiber, op. cit. supra note 7, 523, 565 et scq. collects the cases in
which it has been suggested that rcivoi might have arisen. The eases are
Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556 (1&73) ; Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279
(1884) ; Lando v. Lando, 112 Blinn. 257, 127 N. W. 1125 (1910) ; Guernsey
v. Imperial Bank of Canada, 188 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911); Bell v.
Riggs, 34 Okla. 834, 127 Pac. 427 (1912). In only one of these, Lando
v. Lando, was the problem really involved, but it was not discussed as
such in the opinion. In that case the court in sustaining a marriage in-
cidentally attempted to apply a supposed conflict of laws rule. The de-
cision proceeds upon a rather obvious mistake as to the meaning of the
German Code (art. 13, Introductory Act). The later cases of Ball v.
Cross, 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106 (1921), and Dean v. Dean, 213 App.
Div. 360, 210 N. Y. Supp. 695 (4th Dept. 1925) applied rcivoi in order
to secure greater uniformity in the recognition of the marriage status.
These decisions are found ex\pedient in the states adopting the in pc7-
sonat theory of divorce. For a discussion of New York and Pennsylvania
cases see (1926) 35 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 372.
is See Collier v. Rivaz, supra note 14, at 862.
19 Carried to its logical conclusion there would be a never ceasing ref-
erence between the courts of the countries involved. Westlahe, loc. cit.
supra note 10, explains the final conclusion by the dcistcracnt theory i.e.,
that since both courts refuse to accept jurisdiction of the case at hand,
the court of the forum must of necessity decide the matter. This theory
is criticized by Schreiber, op. cit. supra note 7, at 530.
20 Ball v. Cross, supra note 17.
21 Lando v. Lando, supra note 17.
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ity of a transfer of that realty, it is not for the court of the
forum to hold that that rule should be inapplicable.22
In an attempt by supporters of the vested rights theory to
rationalize these exceptions, 23 it was said that they might be
explained on the ground that they fall within the category of
the "rights" which are vested by a foreign law, and which must
therefore be recognized and enforced by the court of the forum.
According to this view, only where the law of the forum itself
creates the right, i.e., where the property is in the state of the
forum, should the law of the forum be regarded as referring
merely to the local law of the foreign state, exclusive of its rules
of the conflict of laws. This would lead to the application of
renvoi in all contract and tort cases for a right created by a
foreign law is created by the totality of that law-the internal
and the conflict of laws rules-and the proper enforcement of
the right thus created requires that the forum apply the totality
of the foreign law including its conflict of laws rule. But there
is no decision in any country extending the renvoi doctrine to
such cases where the operative facts occur outside of the forum.
Nor does the restatement of the conflict of laws, 24 which pur-
ports to accept the theory of vested rights as the basis of the
conflict of laws, go so far as the above "rationalization," for it
rejects renvoi in general, including cases of contract and tort,
and limits its application to questions of "status" and of "title"
to land.
From the standpoint of the theory of vested rights, a case
should logically be decided in all instances as the court of the
foreign state which is deemed to have created the right would
enforce it. If the court of the forum enforces some right other
than the right which the court of the foreign state would enforce,
it is a misnomer to speak of the recognition and enforcement of
a foreign created vested right. It is singular, therefore, that the
restatement should reject the renvoi doctrine and allow it only
22 The problem was at issue in Re Baines, unreported, decided March
19, 1903 by Mr. Justice Farwell. A digest of the case is found in Schriebor,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 558.
23 (1921) 35 HARv. L. REv. 454.
24 (1926) THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATE-
MENT No. 2:
§ 7. Except as stated in § 8, if a right alleged to have been
created in one state is brought in question in a court of another state, Its
existence will be determined by that court, applying only such part of the
law of the first state as determines in that stdte the creation of similar
rights involving no question of foreign law.
§ 8. If a question of status or of title to land is to be determined, the
court first decides in accordance with its own conflict of laws, by the law of
what state the existence of the status or of the title is to be determined
and it then decides the question as it would be decided by a court of that
state.
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by way of exception in two classes of cases. The only view ade-
quate to do justice to the manifold situations arising in the con-
flict of laws and consistent with true analysis is that the law of
the forum recognizes and enforces in all cases only rights
created by itself. Whether it will take into consideration the
foreign local law or the foreign law inclusive of its conflict of
laws rules in cases involving foreign elements becomes then only
a question of justice and expediency. From this viewpoint it
would seem that, generally speaking, it is best to say that the
court of the forum creates rights only in accordance with the
internal law of the foreign state; and that only in particular
cases, where certainty in the law is thereby promoted, or some
other proper result dictated by policy is thereby attained, should
the right be created in the same manner as the foreign court
would have created it, that is, with reference to the foreign
conflict of laws rule.
ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST
The decisions that arbitrarily limit the recognized exception to
the hearsay rule to statements against pecuniary or proprietary
interest have been widely criticised.' The consequent exclusion
of extia-judicial declarations against penal interest has been de-
plored as illogical and inconsistent. The elements that are
deemed to take a statement against pecuniary interest out of the
realm of inadmissible hearsay are also present if the statement
is against penal interest.- It was this fact that moved Mr.
Justice Holmes to write his dissentig opinion in the Donnelly
case,3 when the United States Supreme Court rejected testimony
tending to show that a third person, then dead, had previously
confessed to the crime for which the defendant was held.
Courts in this country have, nevertheless, very generally
followed the English rule4 which was adopted in the Donnelly
case. But little or no attempt is made to justify the rule. Some
23 WIGAORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 1476-1477 (discussing the his-
torical background of the rule); (1925) 35 A. L. R. 441 (note on Hines
v. Commonwealth); Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 723 (disapproving Donnelly v.
United States); (1913) 26 HARV. L. REV. 755; (1923) 37 HL'd-:. L. flzv.
156; (1923) 10 VA. L. REV. 83.
2 Wigmore, op. cit. svpra note 1, § 1477; Mr. Justice Holmes, di3scnting
in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 24f, 277, 33 Sup. Ct. 449, 461
(1913).
3 Supra, note 2.
4 Goodwin v. State, 161 Ark. 266, 255 S. W. 1095 (1923); West v. State,
155 Ga. 482, 117 S. E. 380 (1923); Factor v. State, 229 Pac. 154 (O1Ja.
Cr. App. 1924) (in this case, however, the declarant was a co-defend-
ant). For a collection of cases see (1925) 35 A. L. R. 441, note. The
Massachusetts hearsay law, [Mass. Gen. Laws (1921) c. 233, §65], ap-
parently cannot be used in criminal cases as a basis for admitting state-
ments against penal interest. See Commonwealth v. Stuart, 207 tfasz.
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courts simply cite cases ;5 others advert to the objections raised
against hearsay generally.6
This weakness" of cases invoking the rule in the Donnelly case
was recently illustrated when in Moyac v. People, 244 Pac. 69
(Colo. 1926), the question was before the Supreme Court of
Colorado for the first time. In this case the defendant was
charged with statutory rape of a girl fifteen years old. The
lower court refused to admit testimony tending to show that one
Galveston, who was out of the jurisdiction at the time of the
trial, had admitted causing the pregnancy of the complaining
witness. The defenddnt was convicted and sentenced to a term
in the penitentiary. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction
on the ground that the alleged admission by Galveston was not
within a valid hearsay exception. The court frankly observed
that ". . . logically there is no distinction between declara-
tions of third parties of pecuniary or proprietary character, and
declarations of criminal liability." 7 But it nevertheless felt
compelled by some vague notion of "comity" (said to exist be-
tween state and federal courts) to follow the Donnelly case.
It is difficult, however, to approve of the court's policy in this
case. Uniformity between the laws of two jurisdictions is desir-
able when it serves to obviate certain obstacles that arise in
inter-jurisdictional affairs. But the question in this case was
one of purely local concern," and furthermore, a deferential atti-
tude of a state court is indeed empty, when in the same opinion
the court declares itself incapable of giving any rational expla-
nation of the view it is adopting. Thus has there been recorded
one more contradiction to Mr. Justice Holmes's observation that
"the rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic
and common sense, less hampered by history than some parts of
the substantive law." 9
563, 568, 93 N. E. 825, 827 (1911); bommonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass.
567, 575, 120 N. E. 209, 212 (1918). In states following the English rule
the fact that the declaration was made on the death bed does not create
an exception to the rule. West v. State, 76 Ala. 98 (1884); Davis v.
Commonwealth, 95 Ky. 19, 23 S. W. 585 (1893). If the declarant is avail-
able at the time of the trial, the necessity for an exception to the hearsay
rule does not arise. 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 1456, 1476. Of.
Goodwin v. State, supra, where, although no mention was made of the fact,
it appeared that the declarant was available.
5 Goodwin v. State, supra note 4; West v. State, 155 Ga. 482, 117 S, E.
380 (1923); Factor v. State, supra note 4.
6 Donnelly v. United States, supra note 2.
7 244 Pac. at 69.
8 Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in the Donnelly case disap-
proved a similar attitude by the Supreme Court with respect to English
precedents.
9 Dissenting opinion, Donnelly v. United States, supra note 2, at 277, 33
Sup. Ct. at 461.
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Moya v. People represents the latest exposition of the majority
view,-n but a counter development is reflected in a still more
recent case, Breinnwn v. State, 134 Atl. 148 (Mld. 1926). In that
case the defendant was charged with bastardy. It appeared that
the complaining witness had directly testified that the defendant
was the father of her child. The lower court refused to admit
evidence offered by the defense to show the following points:
(1) that a third man had committed suicide on the day the child
was born; (2) that on the body was found a letter in the man's
own handwriting, admitting that he was the father of the child
and. giving as the cause of his suicide, threats that had been
made against him because of his responsibility for the pregnancy
of the prosecuting witness (the letter had been lost at the time
of the trial) ; (3) that sometime prior to his death this same
man had told his sister that he was the father of the unborn
child and had asked her for money with which to procure an
abortion on the complaining witness. On appeal it was held
that evidence of the third man's suicide and of the letter in his
handwriting which contained a confession of responsibility
should have been admitted. It was also held that the verba
admission made to his sister before his death might be proved to
corroborate the letter and the alleged cause of the suicide. The
court based its decision on the ground that the facts in the case
were sufficiently unusual to warrant a departure from the major-
ity rule in force in that state.1 Yet the court declared that it
was in no way questioning or overruling the Maryland cases
which held that extrajudicial statements against penal interest
were inadmissible.1s-
The significance of this case as representing the most pro-
nounced departure from the majority rule since its adoption in
the Donnelly case, is better understood after a consideration of
20 A concise yet cogent dissc2 ing opinion in the Moya case was written
by Justice Denison, with whom Justice Adams concurred. Justice Deni-
son cited Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S. E. 843 (1923) of
which no mention was made in the majority opinion. Since the question
was before the Colorado court for the first time, Justice Denison's intel-
ligent views might well have beeen adopted.
31 The Court said, "With these unusual circumstances surrounding this
proposed testimony and safeguarding it against the dangers of fraud and
perjury which are generally urged against similar evidence, we think it
should have been admitted." 134 Atl. at 151.
12 It is seriously to be questioned that the majority view ever Vas
squarely adopted in Maryland. Mlunshower v. State, 55 Md. 11 (138o)
cited as the leading case, involved an e\trajudicial statement, but it ap-
peared that the declarant was available at the time of the trial. Bachr
v. State, 136 Md. 128, 110 Atl. 103 (1920) uttered the majority rule, but
relied on the Mlunshower case. The Maryland court in the Brennan case
did not cite Hines v. Commonwealth, the leading care in it3 ncighboring
state, Virginia.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
other cases that also have questioned the soundness of the ma-
jority rule. For a number of years Texas has in certain cases
recognized the probative force of declarations against penal
interest.13 Courts in that state hold that it is permissible for the
defendant to prove such declarations whenever the state's case
against him is purely circumstantial. 14  The reason for thus
limiting the use of the declarations seems to be that in those
cases the danger of an unjust conviction is more immediate.'"
Several years after the Donnelly case was decided, the supreme
court of Virginia" held admissible the confession of one Jenkins
that he had killed the man for whose murder the defendant had
been tried. The declarant was dead at the time of the trial.
Dicta in the case show a general disapproval of the ruling in the
Donnelly case, but the court, apparently reluctant categorically
to repudiate a holding of the federal Supreme Court, expressly
confined its decision to the particular facts in the case before
it.Y The result was that the case became authority for the use
of an extra-judicial declaration against penal interest only where
:13 Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. App. 30, 114 S. W. 814 (1908). Earlier
cases admitted declarations against penal interest when they constituted
a part of the so called res gestae. Martin v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. App. 317,
26 S. W. 4.00 (1894) (in that case the statement was admitted as evidence
against the defendant). This practice was followed in some other juris-
dictions and, it appears, was not confined to criminal cases. Masons Fra-
ternal Accident Association v. Riley, 65 Ark. 261, 45 S. W. 684 (1898).
In Coleman and Lipscomb v. Frazier, 4 Rich. L. 146 (S. C. 1850), a
declaration against penal interest was freely admitted without question of
its difference from a statement against pecuniary interest.
14 Blocker v. State, supra note 13. But the Texas courts refuse to
extend the rule beyond that situation. Greenwood v. State, 84 Tex. Cr.
App. 548, 208 S. W. 662 (1919); Wise v. State, 101 Tex. Cr. App. 58,
273 S. W. 850 (1925); Stone v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. App. 364, 265 S. W. 900
(1924). The Texas cases also hold that the declaration must exculpate
the defendant. Bates v State, 99 Tex. Cr. App. 647, 271 S. W. 389 (1925);
Hughes v. State, 101 Tex. Cr. App. 540, 276 S. W. 239 (1925). But even
that is, of course, insufficient if the statement does not at the same time
incriminate the declarant. Beckham v. State, 101 Tex. Cr. App. 487, 276
S. W. 240 (1925). Other limitations on the Texas rule arise out of more
general questions of policy in dealing with the hearsay question. Thus,
the extrajudicial declaration of a co-defender will not be admitted. Staten
v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. App. 356, 248 S. W. 356 (1923). Accord: Spurgeon v.
State, 160 Ark. 112, 254 S. W. 376 (1923). Similarly the statement is
excluded where the declarant is claimed by the state to be the defendant'a
accomplice. McCoslin v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. App. 175, 256 S. W. 294
(1923). The confession of a husband to his wife is excluded as a privi-
leged communication. Pace v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. App. 436, 135 S. W. 379
(1911).
25 The Donnelly case appears to have had no influence in the Texas deci-
sions. In McDowell v. State, 96 Tex. App. 512, 258 S. W. 186 (1924), the
court stated the Texas rule in too general terms.
'6 Hines v. Commonwealth, supra note 10.
1 136 Va. at 747, 117 S. E. at 848.
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the state's evidence against the defendant was circumstantial and
where the confession itself was corroborated by other competent
evidence.
It is to be noted that the Bremzna case goes much farther in
a repudiation of the majority view than either the cases in
Texas, or the Virginia case. Since the complaining witness in
the Brenman case directly testified against the defendant, it does
not require that the evidence against the defendant be merely
circumstantial. Furthermore, nothing was said about the neces-
sity for a corroboration of the declaration, other than that
certain evidence otherwise inadmissible might be received
because it tended to support the declaration in question.
In extending the rule in favor of declarations against penal
interest beyond circumstantial cases, the Brcanan case has, it is
submitted, made a satisfactory step toward a complete ratifica-
tion of those declarations as valid hearsay exceptions. If a
declaration against penal interest is deemed sufficiently trust-
worthy ever to be an exception to the hearsay rule, it should be
admitted as freely as a statement against pecuniary interest.
The probative quality of the declaration cannot be affected by
the character of the state's testimony. If the declaration is false,
it ought not to have weight in any case; but the tests of its
truth are those to be applied to any exception to the hearsay
rule, and not the varying weight of evidence on the other side.
While the Brennan case unquestionably has improved the rule,
it is difficult to foretell what will be its effect upon the law in
M.1aryland. The decision purports not to overrule earlier cases
which were said to uphold the majority view. Yet the basis for
its refusal to follow them, namely, "the unusual circumstances
surrounding the proposal testimony," might be urged in almost
any case. What the court seems really to have decided is that
the admission of a declaration against penal interest is a matter
within the discretion of the court. This solution of the problem
has been suggested before, I, and is often resorted to as the most
efficacious method of dealing with other questions of admissi-
bility. 9 But even that view falls short of the result ulti-
mately to be desired, that the declaration, as a matter of law, be
placed on the same footing as a statement against pecuniary
interest.
THE DEPRECIATION PROBLEM IN RATE MAKING
The constitutional guarantee of immunity from confiscation
of property without due process of law has been interpreted as
protecting the privilege of a public utility to earn a fair return
2S (1923) 37 HARV. L. REV. 156.
9 1 WIGMORE, op. cit. svpra note 1, § 16.
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on "the fair value of the property being used by it for the con-
venience of the public."' This has brought many of the admin-
istrative problems of rate fixing before the courts for review.
Since the problem is to limit earning capacity soo that there shall
be no more than a fair return upon the value of properties, it
is obvious that such "value" cannot be ascertained in the cus-
tomary way by determining earning capacity.2 Courts and com-
missions have, therefore, been forced to base their estimates as
to present value on two 3 conflicting tests (as evidence of it),
"cost of reproduction minus depreciation" 4 and "actual prudent
investment." 5 This controversy complicates the problem of de-
preciation.
There are two aspects to the problem of depreciation in rate
making. How much shall be allowed for it as an operating ex-
pense? What significance has it as an element in determining
the rate base? These questions are closely connected and the
answer given to them depends on the choice made as to the basis
for valuation.
1Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898).
2 The most common conception of value is "worth on the market with
reference to sale and exchange." Bauer, Valuation of Public Service
Properties (1915) 30 POL. Sci. QuART. 254 at 256. As value, in the case
of corporations, is largely dependent on the rate of return, a "vicious
circle" is established if rates are made dependent on it. Cf. Cedar Rapidg
Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U. S. 655, 32 Sup. Ct. 389 (1912) ; Min-
nesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913) ; Des Moines Gas
Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U. S. 153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811 (1915) ; Hale, Pseudo Pro-
tection of Property In Rate Cases (1925) 24 MIcH. L. REV. 166; Hale, The
"Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
710; Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts (1920) 33 HAMr. L.
REV. 902, 1031; Richberg, A Permanent Basis For Rate Regulation (1922)
31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 263.
3 The value of service has been suggested as a test but it is criticised as
too indefinite. Edgerton, Value of Service as a Factor in Rate Making
(1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 516. There are also other theories which are
variations of those mentioned.
4 This is favored by the courts as the chief element for consideration.
Minnesota Rate Cases, supra, note 2; Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston,
258 U. S. 388, 42 Sup. Ct. 351 (1922) (cost of reproduction based on
theoretical "normal" price level not the current one); Missouri ox rel.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S. 276, 43
Sup. Ct. 544 (1923); Bluefield Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S.
679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675 (1923); Ohio Utilities Co. v. Public Utilities Comm.,
267 U. S. 359, 45 Sup. Ct. 259 (1925). See also Brown, The Defects in
Mr. Justice Brandeis's Theory of Prudent Investment as a Rate Base
(1924) 12 CALIF. L. REV. 283; Dorety, The Function of Reproduction Cost
in Public Utility Valuation and Rate Making (1923) 37 HARV. L. REV. 173.
-' For this point of view see BA:UER, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES (1925); Hale, op. cit. supra note 2; Henderson, op. cit. supra
note 2; Richberg, op. cit. supra note 2; Whitten, Fair Value For Rate
Purposes (1914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 419; (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOUrNAL,
390; (1921) 19 MICH. L. REV. 849.
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Some, who advocate using the cost of reproduction minus de-
preciation, urge that a charge to operating expenses for depre-
ciation should be permitted to cover only the current cost of re-
placement as the need arisesP Depreciation is made to include
only deferred maintenance, or that degree of deterioration which
impairs the present efficiency of the equipment. From the point
of view of cost of reproduction, this is sufficient to maintain
the present service value of the plant, because an old plant main-
tained in good condition has the same present capacity as a
new plant. This replacement fund system also relieves the public
of the expense of maintaining a depreciation reserve. If this
method is used, the additional factor of depletion must be taken
into consideration; in order to repay the owmers for property
used there must be an added payment when part of the corpus
of the property is taken out and cannot be replaced.7 Separate
funds must be reserved for replacement of equipment and for
depletion of irreparable goods.8 This depletion would have to
be paid for at original cost.0
The other method of allowing for depreciation is to have a
"depreciation reserve" which charges enough to operating ex-
penses to cover the cost of the per cent. of the total life that
has probably been consumed during the period, or the "accrued
depreciation." 'o From the point of view of the "actual pru-
dent investment" theory, this is necessary to maintain the value,
because although the equipment is in good condition, when part
of the probable life is over, so much of the original investment
6 Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Newton, 2G7 Fed. 231 (S. D.
N. Y. 1920), aff'd, 258 U. S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264 (1922); Springfield Gas
& Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Missouri, 10 Fed. (2d) 252
(W. D. Mo. 1925); see note 15 infra.
7 "Depletion" is the consumption of property that cannot be replaced
and should be amortized at the expense of the consumers and not of the
owners of the property. "Depreciation" in the narrow sense is the wear-
ing out of equipment which should be replaced. In the broader sense,
"depreciation" includes any lessening of the investment. Cf. Erie v. Public
Service Comm., 278 Pa. 512, 123 Atl. 471 (1924); Pennsylvania Gas Co.
v. Public Service Comm. of New York, 211 App. Div. 253, 207 N. Y.
Supp. 599 (3d Dept. 1925); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service
Comm. of West Virginia, 14 Fed. (2d) 209 (S. D. W. Va. 1926).8 United Fuel Gas Co. v. R. R. Comm., 13 Fed. (2d) 510 (E. D. Ky.
1925).
9 United Fuel Gas Co. v. R. R. Comm., supra note 8, at 518. "So far
as this factor alone is considered it would seem quite manifest that such
amortization or depletion reserve must be calculated upon investment and
not upon the present value of the so-called acreage."
'0 "Accrued" depreciation is being used to include both physical and
functional depreciation. "Physical, or theoretical, depreciation exists when
a given period of the service life of the plant has elapsed. Assuming that
the entire period of the service life is ten years, after the lapre of five
years theoretical depreciation to the extent of 50 per cent. of the value of
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should be written off the books.- This reserve thus serves the
purpose of both a replacement fund and a depletion fund. Even
though reproduction cost is taken as the chief factor in present
value, accrued depreciation is sometimes permitted to repay for
the deterioration of equipment.1
2
The problem that comes before the courts is usually the extent
to which depreciation shall be considered in the rate base, rather
than in the operating expenses.
If, as the tendency of the courts now seems to be, chief weight
in determining value is to be given to the cost of reproduction,"
an allowance for depreciation is necessary to bring down the
value of the hypothetical new plant to that of the actual old one.
If it were possible to reproduce the identical plant in its present
condition, depreciation would not be involved in the rate base.1
Unfortunately, material in the requisite state of wear cannot be
obtained. As in the case of operating expenses, there is a con-
troversy among the advocates of the "cost of reproduction minus
depreciation," whether only diminution in present capacity shall
be subtracted in determining the rate base."r In terms of present
capacity, "value" would be found by subtracting merely de-
ferred maintenance. But this fails to take into consideration the
fact that the total utility of the new plant minus deferred main-
tenance would be greater than that of the present plant. This
the plant would exist. . . . Functional depreciation may be distin.
guished by the fact that equipment in whole or in part may be superseded
by more efficient inventions . . ." due to obsolescence, inadequacy, or
regulation, when no diminution in the service value has occurred. Kirch-
man, The Principle of Competitive Cost in Public Utility Regulation (1926)
35 YALE LAW JOURNAL; 805 at 815.
31 "A depreciation reserve designed primarily to protect the integrity
of the investment represents roughly the accrued but incomplete deprecia-
tion of parts of the property, which for the property as a whole can never
be made good by maintenance and replacements." WiLcox, DEPRECIATION
IN PUBLIC UTILITIES (1925) 30 Cf. BAUER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 142 fl.
12 Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 29 Sup. Ct. 148 (1909);
Miles v. People's Tel. Co., 166 Wis. 94, 163 N. W. 652 (1917); Chicago
R. R. v. Ill. Commerce Comm., 277 Fed. 970 (N. D. Ill. 1922); Mobile Gas.
Co. v. Patterson, 293 Fed. 208 (N. D. Ala. 1923); Indiana Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Service Comm. of Indiana, 300 Fed. 190 (D. Ind. 1924). But see
supra note 6.
13 See supra note 4.
4  VANDERBLUE, RAILROAD VALUATION BY THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CO7i-
MISSION (1920) 40.
15 Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, supra note 4; City of Winona v.
Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co., 276 Fed. 996 (D. Minn. 1921);
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Whitcomb, 12 Fed. (2d) 279 (W. D. Wash. 1926).
Contra; Minneapolis v. Rand, 285 Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Chesa-
peake and Potomac Tel. Co. of Baltimore v. Whitman, 3 Fed. (2d) 938
(D. Md. 1925); Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Comm., 113 Ohio St. 259,
148 N. E. 817 (1925).
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would be taken care of by the future larger charges for the re-
placement fund.1o It is submitted, however, that this makies
the public pay interest on a higher value than actually exists.
Moreover if accrued depreciation is not used, a case is likely
to arise where, because of the substitution of more efficient equip-
ment, the plant becomes less valuablel- and the court will have
to admit an "error somewhere, either in theory or application
of principle." - Whichever measure of depreciation is used in
determining the rate base, it should be in terms of present value,
not original cost, to be consistent with the measure of value
taken,19 i. e. "cost of reproduction less depreciation."
Because of the doubtful character of the early financing of
most public utilities, the actual prudent investment theory could
not be put into operation in most cases without a preliminary ap-
praisal of the probable original cost. -" If this appraisal were
made, some kind of deduction would have to be made for de-
preciation as well as addition for replacements and improve-
ments to bring the investment down to date. As it would be a
question of how much of the original cost must be written off, the
accrued depreciation based on original cost would be the proper
measure to be used.
2 1
Once this appraisal were made, the problem of depreciation
under the "actual prudent investment" theory would be simply
a matter of accounting. The charges to operating expense,
based on accrued depreciation on the asset side of the ledger,
would equal the additions to the capital, as reflected by the de-
126 "If the proper standard for a 'rate base,' is the present cost of a sub-
stitute plant of equal capacity, as I believe, depreciation can be a func-
tion of it only in ease the allowance for renewals to the plant under con-
sideration will in the future be greater than that of the assumed standard.
If the rates allowed in the future include only an allowance for renewals
of a new plant, the company will have to abate something from its nor-
mal profits because of its emxtraordinary renewal charges. Theoretically
it makes no difference whether this problem is met by giving the plant a
smaller value at present because of its future greater renewal charges,
and then allowing a higher rate for renewal, or by giving it its present
value, based on capacity, and letting it bear its extra renewals out of its
normal profits." Consolidated Gas Co. of New York v. Newton, -upra
note 6, at 239.
17 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U. S. 403, 44 Sup.
Ct. 537 (1924), the company, having patents for equipment for the cheaper
production of gas, installed a new plant for less than it would cost to
duplicate the old equipment and abandoned the old equipment. The Court
held that there would be confiscation unless the patent rights were evaluated
at enough to cover the company's loss by obsolescence.
'Is Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. San Francisco, smpra note 17, at 415, 44
Sup. Ct. at 540.
1-9 Minneapolis v. Rand, supra note 15; Michigan Public Utilities Comm.
v. Michigan Tel. Co., 228 Mich. 658, 200 N. W. 749 (1924).
2 0 BAUER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 176.
2 1 BAUER, op. cit. s-upra note 5, c. VII.
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preciation fund, on the liability side. In this way, the actual
investment, the rate base, would remain unchanged by additions
out of the depreciation fund because these would be balanced by
the deduction for accrued depreciation. 22 Thus there would be
no danger of an over-or an under-valuation due to an exces-
sive or an inadequate charge for depreciation.2
3
Such an over-or under-valuation is likely to happen un-
less the "actual prudent investment" is the rate base. Early
corporations did not save any reserves for depreciation. Later,
commissions regulated rates so closely that nothing over a re-
placement fund could be saved. Recently some companies have
allowed what seems to be too large an amount for depreciation.
In either situation, the use of actual accrued depreciation in
determining the rate base places a loss on the present stock-
holder or on the consumers.24 Thus it has been suggested that
the amount actually saved in the depreciation reserve should
be used in determining the rate base.
A similar question came before the Supreme Court in the
recent case of Board of Public Utility Commissioners v. New
York Telephone Co., No 567, 46 Sup. Ct. 363 (U. S. 1926). The
board found that the company had accumulated a credit balance
of about seventeen million dollars ($16,902,530) for depreciation,
and ordered that future charges for depreciation should be
made against the fund, and should be deducted from the amount
paid by the public as operating expenses until about a fourth
of the fund ($4,750,000) was used up. In effect, the company
was ordered to make up any deficiency in a fair return from
the excessive depreciation fund. The Court held that this could
not be ordered. "The amount, if any, remaining after paying
taxes and operating expenses including the expense of depre-
ciation25 is the company's compensation for the use of its prop-
erty," the court stated in holding that the company could not be
forced to use it to relieve future customers of their obligation
to pay a reasonable return on the capital involved.
22 BAUER, op. cit. supra note 5; WILCOX, op. cit. supra note 11, at 31.
23 Justices Brandeis and Holmes, dissenting in Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. San Francisco, supra note 17; cf. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Co. of Baltimore v. Whitman, supra note 15 (valuation was based on an
appraisal on 1914 costs, plus subsequent investments; held, that an exces-
sive depreciation fund, unless it clearly would never be needed, represented
potential depreciation and should be subtracted in finding the rate base).
24 Hasbrouck, When Should Depreciation Be Deducted to Find the Rate
Making Value of Public Utilities (1925) 10 CORN. L. Q. 471.
25 The Court did not define "depreciation," which was to be included as
an operating expense, but it did recognize the accounting rule of the In-
terstate Commerce Commission of making charges "to cover the deprecia-
tion in the elements of the plant which for one cause or another will go
out of use.)'
COMMENTS
This decision discloses another practical disadvantage of the
"cost of reproduction minus depreciation" theory. The dif-
ficulty in determining what the depreciation will be leads in-
evitably to mistaken estimates. If these miscalculations cannot
be rectified, as the instant case holds, -r there is a permanent loss
to the public or to the company due to the over-or under-
valuation which results from too high or too low a depreciation
fund. This makes it especially desirable to have a method of
determining the rate base in which the correctness of the deter-
mination of depreciation is not so material. As has been shown,
by the "actual prudent investment" theory, once an agreement
has been reached as to what the "actual" investment was, the
allowance for depreciation is merely a bookkeeping matter.
PRIORITIES BETWEEN MORTGAGES AND MECHANICS' LIENS
The lender who takes as security a lien on the land often finds
himself in competition with lienors whose interest in the ,es
arises by operation of law. The most common and perhaps the
most complex of these controversies occurs with respect to the
mechanics' liens given to those who enhance the value of the
land by services or materials in construction and improvement.
These mechanics' liens are wholly statutory, and the legislatures
are so prolific with amendments, and the courts so variable in
their interpretations of the statutory provisions that the state-
ment of general rules is nearly impossible. Each decision must
be studied with strict reference to the statute then in force. But
a consideration of the statutes in comparative groups, with an
indication of general tendencies to allocate the risks with respect
to the contractual lienor, is possible.
There are two types of statutes. In the first, a valid encum-
brance on the land before the mechanic's lien attaches is a
superior claim on both the land and the buildings subsequently
constructed.' Strictly following the common law rule that a
26 This is in accord with the generally accepted rule that past losses or
past gains cannot be taken into account to the advantage or to the detri-
ment of the company in determining a fair return. Galveston Electric Co.
v. Galveston, supra note 4. Certain state commissions have capitalized
early losses as "going concern value,"--the Wisconsin rule. Hill v. Antigo
Water Co., 3 Wis. Ry. Comm. Rep. 623; see (1925) 23 MicH. L. Rsv. 670.
But see (1923) 32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 507. It has been suggested that
an attempt should be made to equalize deficits and unusual earnings over
a longer period than a year. Bauer, Recent Decisions on Valuation and
Rate Mahng (1924) 14 Am. ECON. REv. 254 at 25G; Ruggles, Problckms
of Public Utility Rate RegUlation and Fair Return (1924) 32 Joum;. oF
POL. ECON. 543 at 550; Ryall, Principle of Reparation Applied to Rate
Regulation (1925) 23 MICH. L. REv. 223.
1 Conn. Gen Stat. (1918) § 5217; N. Y. Cons. Laws (1923) c. 34, § 13;
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structure or improvement attached to the land becomes part of
the land, the incumbrancer's prior claim absorbs the building,
and the mechanic lienor is treated in the same manner as any
other subsequent encumbrancer. Regarding policy rather than
logic, such a statute seems to present gratuitously to the prior
incumbrancer at the expense of the mechanic lienor more
security than he had bargained for.
In the second type of statute, the earlier claimant retains his
priority as to the land, but the mechanic lienor is preferred as
to the building or improvements. 2 The theory underlying these
statutes seems to have been borrowed from the common law
artisan's lien, which creates a charge on the specific res until
payment. It rests also on the principle that there is no injustice
in preventing the first lienor from appropriating without com-
pensation the services and material of others to enhance his
security. He is in the same position that he would have been in
if the structure had not been erected. In some states the me-
chanic is privileged to sell and remove the building;3 but if a
severance of the building is impossible without seriously
injuring the structure or the land, the court may order a sale
of both the land and the buildings and apportionment of the
fund.4 In others, the only remedy of the mechanic lienor is
foreclosure and sale on execution of both the land and the build-
ings and a division of the fund.2 The usual measure of appor-
tionment is the extent to which the buildings have enhanced the
value of the property, not the original cost of the services or
materials or the value of the building considered apart from the
land.6 A serious objection to this procedure is that the prior
incumbrancer is forced to foreclose even though his debt may not
be due," but it seems to be one of the inevitable risks which he
assumes in order to provide an equitable adjustment among the
R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) § 4346; Blackmar v. Sharp, 23 R. I. 412, 50 Atl. 852
(1901).
2 Ala. Code (1923) § 8833; Wimberley v. Mayberry & Co., 94 Ala. 240,
10 So. 157 (1891); Colo. Comp. Laws (1921) § 6444; Bitter v. Mouat Lum-
ber & Investment Co., 10 Colo. App. 307, 51 Pac. 519 (1897); Mont. Rev.
Code (1921) § 8344; Murray v. Swanson, 18 Mont. 533, 46 Pac. 441 (1896),
3 Bitter v. Mouat Lumber Co., supra note 2; See Wight, Mechanics' Lions
(1923) 2 Tsx. L. Rnv. 77.
4 Tower v. Moore, 104 Iowa, 345, 73 N. W. 823 (1898); Joralmon v.
McePhee, 31 Colo. 26, 71 Pac. 419 (1903) (brick building).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1921) c. 82, § 16; Bradley v. Simpson, 93 Ill. 93 (1879).
6 Bradley v. Simpson, supra note 5; Wimberley v. Mayberry, supra, note
2. In Fidelity Co. v. Dennis, 93 Va. 504, 25 S. E. 546 (1896), it wag
decreed, however, that the division should not be according to a ratio of
proportionate value, but that the estimated value of the land at timo of
sale should first be deducted and paid to the mortgagee and that tho
residue should be divided among the mechanics' lien claimants.
7 (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 384.
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claimants, especially where severance of the structure is not
feasible.
The problem becomes more complicated where the lien of the
mechanic is claimed for improvements and not for a new in-
dependent structure. The prior incumbrancer's security includes
now not only the land but also the buildings as they were with-
out the improvements. A few states allow a severance if that is
possible;s if not, an apportionment." In this procedure the ob-
jection that the prior incumbrancer is being forced to foreclose
and is "improved out of his security" becomes all the more
serious. To prevent such a result some courts have held that
incapability of severance of an improvement destroys the
priority of the mechanic's lien.10
It must be understood, however, that if the mechanic's lien
is the first incumbrance, it attaches to both the land and the
building in probably all jurisdictions. Therefore, it is important
to know exactly when the mechanic's lien attaches in each case;
and for this purpose, priority in time determines the priority in
legal operation. There are at least four different points of time
from which the lien of the mechanic is held to attach for the
purpose of priority over other incumbrancers. (1) It begins
with the making of the contract between owner and mechanic
for the contemplated building or improvements.1 Unless re-
cordation of the contract is required, this would seem to be pre-
judicial to the rights of innocent parties without actual knowl-
edge of the owner's intentions to build on his property. (2)
The lien runs from the commencement of the building.12  The
theory is that this fact is sufficiently patent to put any prospec-
tive mortgagee on notice that a lien might attach to this property
for these improvements.23 But what is a sufficient commencement
of a building within the rule is difficult to answer. Thus, merely
piling lumber without any other acts of building is patent
s Cameron v. Trueheart, 165 S. W. 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
9 Morrison v. State Trust Co., 274 S. W. 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)
(pavement).
:0Johnson v. Puritan Mining Co., 19 Mont. 30, 47 Pac. 337 (1896)
(mining shaft); cf. Joyce Lumber Co. v. Wick, 200 Iowa, 796, 205 N. W.
476 (1925) (hardwood floors); Dugan v. Scott, 37 Mo. App. 663 (1809)
(painting and glazing).
11 Paddock v. Stout, 121 Ill. 571, 13 N. E. 182 (18S7); Shaughnezsy v.
Isenberg, 213 Mass. 159, 99 N. E. 975 (1912).
1
2 Nixon v. Knights of Pythias, 56 Kan. 298, 43 Pac. 236 (1896); ,ur-
ray v. Swanson, supra note 2. Where each lienor contracts independently
with the owner, each lien dates from the commencement of work: or fur-
nishing of materials of the particular independent contractor. Welch v.
Porter & Co., 63 Ala. 225 (1879).
13 Behrens Lumber Co. v. Lager, 26 S. D, 160, 128 N. W. 698 (1910).
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enough in some states14 but not in others." The working rules
vary in the different states, 6 for it must be remembered that this
is a matter of law and not of fact, of constructive notice and not
actual notice. (3) The lien of each claimant commences to run
from the time that he began to perform his labor or furnish
material." This rule causes a great deal of trouble. It is based
on the theory that a mechanic's lien is an extraordinary remedy
given to protect one who performs labor or furnishes material in
a specific res, and until he begins to perform the labor or furnish
the material he has no claim. But it is even more difficult in this
case to determine the commencement of labor or supply than
it is in the case of "commencement of the building."
Since by its operation an intervening mortgagee may be in-
ferior to some lien claimants and superior to others, an interest-
ing problem arises where the statute provides that there shall
be no priority among the lien claimants as among themselves.
The intervening mortgage, whenever it happens to come in dur-
ing the construction of the building, arbitrarily creates two
classes of mechanic lienors, those who began their labor and
supply before the mortgage and those who began later. Some
courts hold that in such case all the lien claimants are preferred
to the intervening mortgagee who could easily discover that a
building was in the course of erection.3 But here again we have
our problem of constructive notice by "commencement of the
building." Other courts disregard the resulting arbitrary classi-
fication of lienors in the face of the statute and allow the mort-
gagee to intervene. 9 In Connecticut this has been recently en-
14 See James v. Van Horn, 39 N. J. L. 353, 363 (1877).
15 Kansas Mortgage Co. v. Weyerhaeuser, 48 Kan. 335, 29 Pac. 153
(1892); cf. Middletown Savings Bank v. Fellowes, 42 Conn. 36 (1875)
(furnishing lumber and building a fence).
16 For an extreme holding see the Texas rule that a contract with the
architect is the "inception" of the building within the meaning of the
statute. Wight, op. cit. supra note 3.
"TCrowell v. Gilmore, 18 Calif. 370 (1861); Cady Lumber Co. v. Miles,
96 Neb. 107, 147 N. W. 210 (1914) (furnishing lumber for a temporary
shanty held sufficient); of. Waterbury Lumber & Coal Co. v. Asterchin-
sky, 87 Conn. 316, 87 Atl. 739 (1913); Ann. Cas. 1916 B, 613.
18 Gardner v. Leck, 52 Minn. 522, 54 N. W. 746 (1893) (independent
contracts); Oriental Hotel Co. v. Griffiths, 88 Tex. 574, 33 S. W. 652
(1895); see dissent of Ailshie, J. in Pacific States Savings, Loan & Bldg.
Co. v. DuBois, 11 Idaho, 319, 331, 83 Pac. 513, 516 (1905) (independent
contracts). In Minnesota, before the Gardner case, supra, the problem
was worked out thus: a sum equal to the amount of the prior liens was
set aside. From the residue the intervening mortgage was paid first,
then the amount remaining was added to the amount set aside and divided
ratably among the lienors. Finlayson v. Crooks, 47 Minn. 74, 49 N. W.
398, 645 (1891).
19 Crowell v. Gilmore, supra note 17; Pacific States Savings, Loan &
Bldg. Co. v. Du Bois, supra note 18.
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acted by statute.2  It seems unfortunate that a third party may
thus seriously affect the substantive rights of the lienors. (4)
In Vermont2' and New York -2 there is no mechanic's lien without
filing. Priorities are determined solely with reference to the date
of filing, being strictly analogous to the priorities existing among
several mortgagees. Registry may be had at any time after
beginning to perform labor or furnish materials.
A few exceptions to the general rules, depending on the
purpose for which the mortgage is given, are recognized. Where
a mortgage is given for the purpose of paying for improvements.
in a state where a subsequent mechanic's lien has a superior
claim on the building, the mortgage is prior as to both the land
and the buildings with respect to the money actually used to
pay for construction.2 3  The theory is that the building l6an
mortgagee is performing a service in the construction of the
building just as much as the mechanics who perform labor or
furnish materials. It is submitted that a more equitable adjust-
ment would be to equalize the claims of the building loan mort-
gagee and the mechanic lien claimants as to the building rather
than to prefer the mortgagee..2 4 Where a mortgage, after the
mechanics' liens attached, was used in liquidating a mortgage
prior to the mechanics' liens, it has been subrogated to this
priority to the extent of the former lien.2;
An interesting situation arises where a vendee in possession
under a contract for the sale of land, either oral or written,
begins to build and later, on receiving a conveyance, gives a
purchase money mortgage back to the vendor. The result is
almost universal that the purchase money mortgagee has a
preference; but the cases work out this result by tvo distinct
lines of reasoning. One argument is that a vendor who delivers
possession of an estate to a purchaser without receiving the
purchase price is given in equity a lien on the land in the nature
of a constructive trust to the extent of the amount unpaid, and
the later purchase money mortgage is merely a continuation in
changed form of the vendor's lien.6 The idea is analogous to
20 Conn. Pub. Acts (1925) 3905-6.
21 Hinckley & Egery Iron Co. v. James, 51 Vt. 240 (1878).
22 N. Y. Cons. Laws (1923) c. 34, § 38; Paris v. Lawyers' Title Insurance
& Trust Co., 141 App. Div. 866, 126 N. Y. Supp. 753 (2d Dept. 1010).
23 Chauncey v. Dyke Bros., 119 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902); Jorabnon
v. McPhee, supra note 4; cf. Franklin Soc. v. Thornton, 85 N. J. Eq. 37,
95 Atl. 374 (1915).
24 Cf. Ward v. Yarnelle, 173 Ind. 535, 91 N. E. 7 (1910).
25 First Ave. Coal Co. v. King, 193 Ala. 438, 69 So. 549 (1915). Com-
pare with Joralmon v. AMePhee, smpra note 4, as to subrogation to a former
mortgagee's priority.
26 Malmgren v. Phinney, 50 Minn. 457, 52 N. W. 915 (1892); Nel v.
Kinney, 11 Ohio St. 58 (1860); Irish v. Lundin, 28 Neb. 84 (ISS9).
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that of subrogation. The other cases reason from the statutes
which provide that the "owner" can subject to a mechanic's lien
only the interest which he himself has in the land. The vendee
in possession under a contract for the sale of land is said to
have an "equitable interest" ; this alone is affected.21 Nor is
the mere instantaneous seisin which vests in the vendee
between the conveyance by the vendor and the reconvey-
ance by the purchase money mortgage of the vendee, sufficient
to have the lien attach.28 But if the vendee is in possession under
an agreement with the vendor that a building is to be erected,20
or if the vendor has consented to the construction work,30 or, in a
few cases, even if he merely has knowledge that the vendee is
building on the land,3' the mechanics' liens are held to be superior
under some sort of an agency relationship by which the vendee
can affect the legal interest of the ,vendor. This agency is ap-
parent where the agreement or consent is express; but mere
acquiescence by a seller who has knowledge seems insufficient to
create any agency relationship. This is explained, perhaps, on
the ground that in the former cases a "contract" with the owner
is required by the statute while in the latter "consent" (which
may be implied) is all that is necessary.
32
Up to this point we have been discussing the normal case of a
duly recorded mortgage. Now suppose that the mortgagee has
failed to record his mortgage. What are his rights as against a
subsequent mechanic lienor? In the majority of jurisdictions a
mechanic lienor is not a bona fide purchaser for value within
the recording statutes, so that the lien of the mortgage begins
to run from the time of its execution.3 But in Arkansas an
unrecorded mortgage, although good between the parties, is not
a lien on the land as respects third persons until recorded."
Under this provision the mechanic's lien has priority.
The majority ruld as to recordation often causes a peculiar
27Russell v. Grant, 122 Mo. 161, 26 S. W. 958 (1894); Getto v. Friend,
46 Kan. 24, 26 Pac. 473 (1891) ; Hickox v. Greenwood, 94 Ill. 266 (1880).
28 Hillhouse v. Pratt, 74 Conn. 113, 49 Atl. 905 (1901). But -where the
mortgage for purchase money is to one other than the grantor, there is
a sufficient seisin for the liens to attach. (1917) 30 HArv. L. REv. 293.
9 Jones v. Osborne, 108 Iowa, 409, 79 N. W. 143 (1899); Carew v.
Stubbs, 155 Mass. 549, 30 N. E. 219 (1892).
30 White v. Kincade, 95 Kan. 466, 148 Pac. 607 (1915); Hill v. Gill, 40
Minn. 441, 42 N. W. 294 (1889).
31 Buckstaff v. Dunbar, 15 Neb. 114, 17 N. W. 345 (1883); of. Allen v.
Rowe, 19 Or. 188, 23 Pac. 901 (1890).
32 JoNEs, LIENS (3d ed. 1914) §§ 1251, 1254-5.
3 Fletcher v. Kelly, 88 Iowa, 475, 55 N. W. 474 (1893); Mathwig v.
Mann, 96 Wis. 213, 71 N. W. 105 (1897). But if the mortgagee withholds
record in order to give his mortgagor a false credit he loses his preference.
Maine v. Waterloo Bank, 198 Iowa, 16, 199 N. W. 414 (1924).
34 O'Neill v. Lyric Amusement Co., 119 Ark. 454, 178 S. W. 406 (1915).
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puzzle of three cornered priorities. For example, in Millcr V.
Stoddard,35 A conveyed to B giving a purchase money mortgage
which A failed to record. C began to work on a house. D took
a mortgage during the progress of the building which he did
record, but which the court, by reason of its rule as to mortgages
given during the progress of a building, held inferior to C's Hen.
D, because of recordation, had a lien superior to the claim of
A. The result was as follows: A's lien was prior to C's, C's lien
wag prior to D's, but D's lien was prior to A's.-6 The court
decreed that from the money realized from the foreclosure and
sale a sum equivalent to A's mortgage should be set aside. Out
of this was to be paid the amount of D's claim, and then the bal-
ance to A. As to the remaining fund the mechanic lienors were
to take first, then any sum still owing to A, and the residue if any
to B, the owner. The mechanic lienors took the risk that there
might be an earlier unrecorded mortgage, but not that any
mortgage would intervene during the progress of the work, so
that they were entitled to a priority on the sum from which the
earlier unrecorded mortgage had been deducted. The mort-
gagee D assumed the risk of inferiority to any lien claimants
but not of an unrecorded mortgage, so that as between the mort-
gagees he should be satisfied first. The purchase money mort-
gagee risked the recording of a subsequent mortgage but not
the attaching of subsequent liens. Worldng the problem out in
this fashion the rights of each claimant seem to be equitably
adjusted, but a closer examination of the inherent inconsistency
of this combination of priorities will show that the court's con-
clusion is open to question. An example will serve to illustrate.
Suppose the foreclosure sale nets $4500; that A's claim is for
$3000; C's for $2000; and D's for $2000. Following the sug-
gested solution, a sum equal to A's claim for $3000 is set aside,
and out of this D's $2000 claim is deducted. The courts theory
is that A is getting his full "priority" of $3000 with respect to
C, but since he is inferior to D for the failure to record, D
shares in A's "priority" to the full extent of his claim of $2000
leaving only $1000 to A. After the $3000 fund has been set
aside there remains a balance of $1500. A has apparently re-
ceived his full "priority" with respect to C, and since D has
received full payment he does not share in this fund. Even in
the event that there is more due him, as between the tho, C has
the superior lien, and is entitled to a prior claim in the $1500
fund, which in this case completely absorbs it. What are the
results? A gets $1000, C gets $1500, and D, $2000. D has
35 54 Bminn. 486, 56 N. W. 131 (1893).
36 For other situations of three cornered priorities, see Jone3 v. Jonez, S
Sim. 633 (Ch. 1838); Hoag v. Sayre, 33 N. J. Eq. 552 (13S1); Puuis,
CASES ON MORTGAGES (1926) 134, n.
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been paid in full, but C, who was prior to D, received only par-
tial payment. A has received only $1000, and yet he was prior
to C who gets $1500. Again, we might vary our example by
setting aside a fund equivalent to C's claim, or D's claim, and
the results would be relatively different. The court's action in
singling out, as a measure of the fund to be set aside, the sum
due to A, was arbitrary hut it may, perhaps, be justified. A
could have avoided the situation by an act of recordation, and
it is not unjust that he be penalized by allowing D to share in
his "priority." Without this, it seems that the only alternative
open would have been to cut the Gordian knot and destroy these
mutually destructive priorities by an arbitrary, equal division.
H. L. N.
